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Climate change is complex during the best of times.  It is 
commonly conceptualized as the quintessential global collective 
action problem: it affects those who do not contribute to it while 
the benefits of climate change mitigation measures are not 
restricted to those who pursue such measures.  This 
conceptualization illustrates the high transaction costs involved 
in domestic policies as well as in international agreements 
addressing climate change, and it is of academic and practical 
interest.  As such, this Article discusses the current challenges 
that climate change policies face, focusing on the linkages 
between the climate change policies of the Trump administration 
and the COVID-19 pandemic and on the effects of those linkages, 
both in the United States and globally.  Specifically, this Article 
addresses the Trump administration’s attacks on climate science 
and its deregulatory climate agenda, as well as the United States’ 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.  In 
addition, it discusses principles of international law and the 
challenges related to state liability for environmental harms in 
the context of the COVID-19 crisis.  This Article also assesses how 
the United States’ climate policies are likely to aggravate 
inequalities both domestically, as well as globally, in the 
aftermath of the pandemic. 
This Article offers several original contributions.  First, it 
provides a unique assessment of how the deregulatory climate 
policies implemented nationally and internationally by the 
Trump administration have magnified the COVID-19 crisis.  
Second, the law and economics methodology used in this Article 
validates the claim that improving environmental quality is 
connected to optimizing early regulatory action.  Third, this 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/3
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Article discusses the challenges of state liability for climate 
harms in the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from 
the Paris Agreement and concurrent COVID-19 pandemic.  
Finally, this Article offers relevant insights for the literature on 
climate change that are likely to be applicable to critical future 
situations, whether they are health-related, a global economic 
crisis, or climate-related emergencies. 
Ultimately, this Article concludes that, in the aggregate, all 
such climate change policies have contributed to increased 
pollution, including elevated greenhouse gas emissions that have 
aggravated pre-pandemic inequalities embedded within the 
United States and among countries.  Consequently, the domestic 
and international policy choices of the Trump administration are 
worsening the impact of the pandemic, particularly for those in 
more vulnerable positions, as well as indelibly poisoning the 
global commons. 
Keywords: climate change, climate policy, international 
environmental law, international law, international energy law, 
COVID-19, pandemic, deregulation, Trump administration, 
Paris Agreement, international liability, climate harm, 
inequality. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is complex during the best of times.  It is 
commonly conceptualized as the quintessential global collective 
action problem1: it affects those who do not contribute to it while 
the benefits of climate change mitigation measures are not 
restricted to those who pursue such measures.2  This 
conceptualization illustrates the high transaction costs involved 
in domestic policies, as well as in international agreements 
addressing climate change, and it is of academic and practical 
 
1. Daniel C. Esty & Anthony L. I. Moffa, Why Climate Change Collective 
Action Has Failed and What Needs to be Done Within and Without the Trade 
Regime, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 777 (2012).  Pollution, after all, is the paradigmatic 
example of the tragedy of the commons.  See also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy 
of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968) (“The rational man finds that his 
share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the 
cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for 
everyone, we are locked into a system of ‘fouling our own nest,’ so long as we 
behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprises.”). 
2. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, DEALING WITH LOSERS: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF POLICY TRANSITION 120 (2014). 
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interest.  As such, this Article discusses the current challenges 
that climate change policies face, focusing on the linkages 
between the climate change policies of the Trump 
administration and the COVID-19 pandemic, and on the effects 
of those linkages, both in the United States and globally.3  
Specifically, this Article addresses the Trump administration’s 
attacks on climate science and its deregulatory climate agenda, 
as well as the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement.  This Article concludes that, in the aggregate, all 
these climate change policies have contributed to increased 
pollution, including elevated greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions 
that have intensified pre-pandemic inequalities embedded 
within the United States and among other countries.  
Consequently, the domestic and international policy choices of 
the Trump administration are worsening the impact of the 
pandemic, particularly for those in more vulnerable positions, as 
well as indelibly poisoning the global commons. 
Despite the complexity of climate change, the scientific 
knowledge outlining broad principles on the topic is 
uncontested.4  Of course this does not, as in any scientific 
endeavor, abolish all uncertainty.5  This uncertainty is further 
heightened by novelty; the changes that will potentially be 
caused by climate change have few precedents in the history of 
the Earth.6  Accordingly, predictions are perennially affected by 
uncertainty, speculation, and lack of information regarding 
future GHG emissions, the effects of past and future emissions 
on the climate system, the impact of changes in climate on the 
physical and biological environment, and how such 
environmental effects might translate into economic damage.7  
 
3. The World Health Organization officially declared COVID-19 a 
pandemic on March 11, 2020.  Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir-Gen., WHO 
Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-
remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020. 
4. See Antony Millner et al., Ambiguity and Climate Policy 3 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 16050, 2010) (highlighting that 
empirical predictions based on sophisticated models may lead to different 
forecasts). 
5. See generally ANDREW DESSLER & EDWARD A. PARSON, THE SCIENCE AND 
POLITICS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE  1 (2d ed., 2010). 
6. Id. at 2. 
7. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES, 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/3
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Despite potential uncertainties about the precise time-frame 
and costs involved, the impacts of climate change are estimated 
to be severe.8  These estimations include both market damages 
(e.g., infrastructure, tourism, increased energy demand, among 
others) and non-market damages (such as the impact on ecology 
and cultural values, for instance).9 
In such a context, climate change presents unique 
challenges for domestic and international regulation, as it refers 
primarily to future events,10 with consequences that require 
policy coordination and multi-level governance (specifically, at 
national and international levels).11  Three main factors 
contribute to the complexity of climate policies.  First, human 
behavior discounts the value of long-term challenges in favor of 
present gains.12  Second, the majority of countries in the 
developed world are democracies based on electoral cycles that 
tend to reward short-term considerations.13  Third, regulatory 
efforts face additional hurdles because the connection between 
the risks of climate change (storms, rising sea levels, fires, 
floods) and climate change itself is not immediate to the public.14  
Therefore, transaction costs for the involved parties are very 
high, despite the immediate need to enact climate change 
 
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF 
CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, 3 
(2016).  See generally O. Hoegh-Guldberg et al., The Human Imperative of 
Stabilizing Global Climate Change at 1.5°C, 365 SCI. 1 (2019) (contending the 
immediate need for meaningful climate change policies, as the synergistic 
nature of climate threats has not been fully assessed and the outcomes are 
likely to be worse than the sum of the parts). 
8. See ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 230 (2013). 
9. Charles Kolstad et al., Social, Economic, and Ethical Concepts and 
Methods, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 212 
(Edenhofer et al eds., 2014). 
10. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2011). 
11. Esty & Moffa, supra note 1, at 777. 
12. See GIDDENS, supra note 10, at 3 (explaining future discounting, 
namely, the idea that humans prefer a small present reward instead of a future 
large reward).  See generally Peter C. Fishburn & Ariel Rubinstein, Time 
Preference, 23 INT’L ECON. REV. 677 (1982) (on present bias and discounting 
rate). 
13. See generally GIDDENS, supra note 10, at 2−6. 
14. See Cary Coglianese, Climate Change Necessitates Normative Change, 
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regulation both domestically and under international treaties.15 
Having established the importance of climate regulation in 
the national and global spheres,16 this Article investigates the 
linkages between the deregulatory climate agenda pursued by 
the Trump administration17 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 
both spheres.  Starting with the national perspective, this 
Article discusses particular deregulatory actions either 
implemented or proposed by the Trump administration that are 
likely to adversely impact the pandemic and the current climate 
crisis.  The selected policies are the most likely to have 
significant consequences for these emergencies.  Pollution in 
general, including GHGs, adversely impacts one’s immunity and 
respiratory systems, making individuals more vulnerable to the 
COVID-19 virus.18  Hence, attacks on climate science and the 
following proposed deregulatory policies are examined: directing 
agencies to neglect GHG emissions and the related grant of 
license that authorizes construction of pipelines coupled with 
undue delays in issuing energy regulations, the repeal of the 
Clean Air Act, the repeal of the Clean Power Plan and related 
threats to air quality, the flexibilization of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, the rollback of regulations promoting 
fuel efficiency, and the relaxation of regulatory standards and 
overall enforcement during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
As for the international sphere, this Article focuses on how 
the Trump administration has undermined global cooperation 
 
15. See Charles F. Sabel & David G. Victor, Governing Global Problems 
Under Uncertainty: Making Bottom-Up Climate Policy Work, 144 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 15, 18 (2017). 
16. The need for academic investigation of the Trump administration’s 
climate policies in both spheres is also motivated by the Trump administration 
deregulatory agenda.  After all, President Trump has demonstrated “little 
enthusiasm either for environmental enforcement or for minority 
communities.”  See generally Michael B. Gerrard, Emergency Exemptions from 
Environmental Laws, in LAW IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 88 (Katharina Pistor 
ed., 2020). 
17. Jessica Wentz & Michael B. Gerrard, Persistent Regulations: A 
Detailed Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Efforts to Repeal Federal 
Climate Protections, COLUM. L. SCH. 1, 1 (2019), 
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/d8-3dcs-3h21. 
18. See Jason A. Schwartz, Weakening Our Defenses: How the Trump 
Administration’s Deregulatory Push Has Exacerbated the COVID-19 
Pandemic, N.Y.U. INST. POL’Y INTEGRITY 1, 4 (2020) (https://policy 
integrity.org/publications/detail/weakening-our-defenses (see also medical 
references therein). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/3
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on climate matters.  The reduction of carbon emissions and 
GHGs are at the core of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”)19 and its corollary, 
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.20  Both treaties were 
informed by the best-available scientific knowledge.21  Scientific 
consensus correlates climate change with global warming, of 
which one human-induced cause is the accumulation of GHGs in 
the atmosphere.22  Ignoring the severe risks and costs associated 
with the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change,23 the Trump administration decided to 
 
19. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 
23, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The UNFCCC 
entered into force on March 21, 1994. The scientific consensus regarding the 
existence of climate change and the necessity of mitigation were paramount 
considerations during UNFCCC negotiations. John Houghton, Science and 
International Environmental Policy: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 355–57 (Richard Revesz et al. eds., 2000). 
20. United Nations Paris Agreement art. 2, Dec. 12, 2015, 54113 U.N.T.S. 
88 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. The Paris Agreement, with its goal of 
reducing GHGs, was negotiated following the legal framework of the UNFCCC, 
a treaty with 196 state parties to which the Senate gave its advice and consent 
in 1992.  See also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2018). 
21. See María Pía Carazo, Contextual Provisions: Preamble and Article 1, 
in THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 
109–10 (Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017). 
22. The scientific community overwhelmingly acknowledges the existence 
of climate change and that GHG emissions are a primary cause.  See Richard 
S.J. Tol, Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the 
Literature: A Re-Analysis, 73 ENERGY POL’Y 701 (2014); see also Richard S.J. 
Tol, The Elusive Consensus on Climate Change 8 (U. Sussex Bus. Sch., Working 
Paper No. 03-2019, 2019) (emphasizing that 97% of scientific studies point to 
human activity as “the most important factor in climate change since 1950”).  
The EPA, for instance, acknowledges that the combustion of fossil fuels is 
likely the human activity that contributes most to the concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere.  See Carbon Dioxide Emissions, EPA (last updated 
Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-
gases#carbon-dioxide. 
23. The costs involved are significant.  A recent study on heat-related 
mortality avoided by lowering current emissions in line with the Paris 
Agreement found that, with a high degree of confidence and using conservative 
estimations, the United States would avoid from 70 to 1,980 annual heat-
related deaths.  See Y.T. Eunice Lo et al., Increasing Mitigation Ambition to 
Meet the Paris Agreement’s Temperature Goal Avoids Substantial Heat-Related 
Mortality in U.S. Cities, 5 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 4 (2019).  According to the EPA, 
natural disasters in 2017 caused $306.2 billion in cumulative damages, making 
the year the most expensive on record.  The report also emphasized that 
7
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formalize that withdrawal.24  This will lead to increasing GHG 
emissions and overall pollution,25 thus negatively impacting the 
mitigating effects of the pandemic. 
Aggravating this scenario, the negative environmental 
effects of the pandemic will be dire, which is contrary to common 
assumptions.  The International Energy Agency (“IEA”) warns 
that, unless investments are made in cleaner and more resilient 
energy infrastructure, total emissions may rebound (as they 
have done after previous economic crashes) to levels higher than 
before the crisis.26  Corroborating such warnings, a new review 
of the empirical literature concluded that, despite the temporary 
reduction of global carbon emissions due to the pandemic,27 
benefits for the planet will not be as hoped.28  Another study 
found that the immediate climate effects of the pandemic-related 
restrictions are close to negligible, and lasting effects, if any, will 
be dependent upon the recovery strategy that is adopted in the 
medium term.29  As carbon dioxide emissions are expected to 
 
climate change is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of such 
events.  See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA 530-F-19-003, PLANNING FOR NATURAL 
DISASTER DEBRIS (2019). 
24. The United States served notice of the withdrawal on the first date 
possible under the Paris Agreement. See Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice 
to Quit Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreement-
climate.html.  The U.S. withdrawal will likely take effect on Nov. 4, 2020.  See 
also Paris Agreement, supra note 20, at 28 (outlining the withdrawal 
mechanism). 
25. See Lo et al., supra note 23, at 6. 
26. See generally Global Energy Review: 2020, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Apr. 
2020), https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2020. 
27. See Corinne Le Quéré et al., Temporary Reduction in Daily Global CO2 
Emissions During the COVID-19 Forced Confinement, 10 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 647, 652 (2020) (contending that any changes in carbon dioxide 
emissions are likely temporary because social changes alone, without benefits 
to wellbeing and supporting infrastructure, will not lead to the deep and 
sustained reductions needed to achieve net zero emissions). 
28. See Andrew Hook et al., A Systematic Review of the Energy and 
Climate Impacts of Teleworking, 15 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 1, 2–5 (2020) 
(explaining that there is much uncertainty about potential savings of 
teleworking; factors considered are an increase in home energy use and more 
travels due to the absence of a commute). 
29. See Piers M. Forster et al., Current and Future Global Climate 
Impacts Resulting from COVID-19, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 913, 918 
(2020) (highlighting that without long-term system-wide decarbonization of 
economies, even globally significant shifts in behavior are insufficient to 
achieve anything but modest reductions). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/3
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quickly rebound,30 the benefits accrued during the pandemic are 
expected to be superseded by retaliatory pollution.31  Moreover, 
the decline in green energy investments that has been provoked 
by the pandemic may also contribute to a spike in carbon 
emissions.32  Pandemic-related cleaning and disinfecting 
activities are also expected to have negative environmental 
impacts.33 
In light of the above, this Article offers several original 
contributions.  First, it provides a unique assessment of how the 
deregulatory climate policies implemented nationally and 
internationally by the Trump administration have magnified 
the COVID-19 crisis.  Second, the law and economic methodology 
used in this Article, as applied to the linkages between climate 
change and the pandemic, validates the claim that improving 
environmental quality is connected to optimizing early 
regulatory action.34  Third, this Article discusses the challenges 
of state liability for climate harms in the aftermath of the United 
States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and concurrent 
COVID-19 pandemic.  Finally, this Article offers relevant 
insights for the literature on climate change that are likely to be 
applicable to critical future situations, whether they are health-
related, a global economic crisis,35 or climate-related 
 
30. See Le Quéré et al., supra note 27, at 652. 
31. See Brad Plumer et al., The Coronavirus and Carbon Emissions, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/climate/nyt-
climate-newsletter-coronavirus.html (noting that in China, previous 
experience shows that industries have tried to ramp up production to make up 
for lost output or temporary shutdown, a practice called “retaliatory pollution” 
by Li Shuo, senior advisor of Greenpeace Asia). 
32. See Kevin Dennehy, Decline in Green Energy Spending Might Offset 
COVID-Era Emissions Benefits, YALE SCH. ENV’T (June 22, 2020), 
https://environment.yale.edu/news/article/drop-in-green-energy-investments-
could-outweigh-silverlining-benefits-of-pandemic. 
33. See Manfred Lenzen et al., Global Socio-Economic Losses and 
Environmental Gains From the Coronavirus Pandemic, 15(7) PLOS ONE 1, 5 
(2020). 
34. See Michael A. Livermore et al., Global Cost-Benefit Analysis, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 5 
(Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds., 2013). 
35. See COVID-19: An Unprecedented Global Health and Economic Crisis, 
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/topics/covid-19 (last visited Jan. 19, 
2021) (contending that, because of the pandemic, global oil and gas markets 
were facing the unprecedented situation of collapsing demand and an already 
abundant supply that continues to increase). 
9
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emergencies.36 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II focuses on the 
domestic sphere, analyzing the climate deregulation measures 
that will likely have an adverse impact on the COVID-19 crisis.  
Part III analyzes a major deregulatory action that will 
negatively impact the pandemic: the withdrawal of the United 
States from the Paris Agreement.  It also examines principles of 
international law and the challenges related to state liability for 
environmental harms in the context of the COVID-19 crisis.  
Part IV discusses how the United States’ climate policies are 
likely to aggravate inequalities, both domestic and global, in the 
aftermath of the pandemic.  It examines how these inequalities 
are similar and then highlights that those who are bearing the 
major consequences of COVID-19 have already been facing the 
adverse impacts of climate change.  Part V concludes that 
President Trump’s climate policies are not maximizing the 
wellbeing of the U.S. population and have exacerbated the 
impact of the pandemic domestically as well as globally.  
Accordingly, the United States needs an approach to climate 
change policies that is coherent on both the national and global 
stages.  Ultimately, these policies need to reconcile the 
maximization of wellbeing and equity, leading to a paradigmatic 
change; instead of poisoning of the commons, the country will be 
part of the cure. 
II. WORSENING THE COVID-19 CRISIS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACKS ON CLIMATE SCIENCE 
AND DEREGULATORY CLIMATE POLICIES 
The deregulatory policies discussed in this Part, whether 
proposed or implemented, are those most likely to have 
significantly adverse consequences for the COVID-19 pandemic 
and current climate crisis.  There is growing consensus that 
cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, cancer, diabetes, 
asthma, obesity, and chronic neurological disorders, including 
 
36. See Owen Jones, Why Don’t We Treat the Climate Crisis with the Same 
Urgency as Coronavirus?,  GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2020, 6:52 AM),  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/05/governments-
coronavirus-urgent-climate-crisis (“While coronavirus is understandably 
treated as an imminent danger, the climate crisis is still presented as an 
abstraction whose consequences are decades away.  Unlike an illness, it is 
harder to visualize how climate breakdown will affect us each as individuals.”). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/3
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dementia, are aggravating factors for COVID-19.37  Pollution 
(whether particulate matter, chemical, GHG, or air pollution) 
increases the likelihood of those diseases, aggravates their 
symptoms, and expands individual vulnerability to the COVID-
19 virus.38 
Part II, in addition to discussing attacks on climate science 
by the Trump administration, examines the following proposed 
deregulatory policies: (i) the direction to agencies to neglect both 
GHG emissions and the related grant of license that authorizes 
construction of pipelines, as well as undue delay of regulation 
issuance, (ii) the repeal of the Clean Air Act, (iii) the repeal of 
the Clean Power Plan and related threats to air quality, (iv) the 
flexibilization of the National Environmental Policy Act, (v) the 
rollback of regulations promoting fuel efficiency, and (vi) the 
flexibilization of regulatory standards and overall enforcement 
during the COVID-19 pandemic.  This Part also addresses the 
use of flawed scientific evidence, as well as the tempering of cost-
benefit analysis involved in such major deregulatory climate 
policies. 
This Part is premised on the use of cost-benefit analysis to 
improve the environment and individual health.39  Cost-benefit 
analysis aims at the maximization of overall well-being,40 and it 
assumes that rational administrative agencies should work to 
maximize such wellbeing.41  This Part further assumes that the 
actual consideration of costs and benefits is indicative of a 
reasoned administrative action, i.e., one that is justified rather 
than arbitrary.42  Reasoned decision-making, after all, is a 
 
37. See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 4−6. 
38. See id. 
39. This research assumes that, for governments to make good decisions, 
they must avoid “gut-level decision making” and should not abandon reasoned 
analysis.  RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING 
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 3 (2008). 
40. “Cost-benefit analysis is best defended as a welfarist decision 
procedure.  Cost-benefit analysis is justified as a decision procedure to the 
extent that it advances overall wellbeing—that is, the wellbeing of the public 
generally, if not necessarily every member of the public—relative to alternative 
decision procedures, including the null case of doing nothing.”  MATTHEW D. 
ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 6 
(2006).  “Public,” for the purposes of this article, is the U.S. general population. 
41. See id. at 25. 
42. See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 749–53 (2015) (determining that 
11
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requisite for any administrative action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).43  Therefore, 
deregulation, which involves removing existing regulations in a 
particular market, needs to be reasoned: where regulatory 
norms exist, the administration is required to justify their 
revocation.44  Adding interest to the current investigation is the 
fact that, despite administrative deference, the Trump 
administration’s success rate is approximately 9%, which is 
significantly lower than the 66% average.45 
Having established such premises, this Part turns now to 
the deregulatory climate policies of the Trump administration46 
that are most likely to significantly aggravate the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
 
consideration of costs is mandatory for executive agencies); see also CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 3 (2018) (discussing the rise of the 
cost-benefit state and the trend of judicial decisions requiring cost 
considerations as indicative of non-arbitrariness); Daniele Bertolini & 
Carolina Arlota, Why Michigan v. EPA Requires that the Meaning of the 
Cost/Rationality Nexus Be Clarified, 29 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 125, 155 (2017) 
(arguing, inter alia, that the United States Supreme Court neglected to 
consider cost as a relational concept). 
43. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (mandating courts to invalidate actions found to 
be “arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law”). 
44. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Chevronizing Around Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 70 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3–4) (noting 
that the Obama-era regulations that President Trump aims to repeal were 
based on plausible cost-benefit analysis whereas the Trump administration’s 
deregulatory initiatives actually fail cost-benefit analysis). 
45. Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, N.Y.U INST. POL’Y 
INTERGITY, https://policyintegrity.org/deregulation-roundup (last visited Mar. 
1, 2021) (regarding agency cases that involve proposed rollbacks).  According 
to the Roundup, the administration won eight cases while losing seventy-eight.  
Thus, this Article infers that the success rate of the Trump administration is 
9.3% as of June 2020.  Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, High Court Rulings 
Highlight Trump’s Administrative Law Stumbles, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 19, 
2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/high-court-rulings-
highlight-trumps-administrative-law-stumbles (citing the 70% success rate of 
previous administrations, on average).  See generally David Zaring, Reasonable 
Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 177−84 (2010) (arguing that, regardless of the 
standard of review, courts in the United States are likely to affirm agencies’ 
actions more than two-thirds of the time). 
46. Some of the arguments advanced in section A of Part II appear in a 
previous work.  Carolina Arlota, How President Trump’s War on Science 
Undermines Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Policies, 50 ELR 10999 (2020). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/3
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A. President Trump’s War on Climate Science 
Early in Trump’s term in office, renowned scientists 
censured the administration, claiming that science and objective 
truth had never been more strained.47  Attacks on science, 
however, are not recent or unique to the United States48 nor to 
this administration.49  Despite global attacks,50 experts have 
called the Trump administration’s disregard for scientific 
knowledge “worse than . . . ever.”51  Top governmental 
administrative positions, including those in the EPA, are 
occupied by former lobbyists with intimate financial connections 
to the agencies they are responsible for overseeing.52  Studies 
comparing Trump’s administration and previous presidencies 
have also found evidence of unprecedented behavior, including 
President Trump’s disregard for the findings of the government’s 
own scientists.53  During this administration, the attacks on 
climate science and related censorship of scientists at the federal 
level became common and further spread to the state level, with 
initiatives eventually replicating such actions at all levels of 
 
47. See Jonathan Foley, The War on Facts Is a War on Democracy, SCI. 
AM. BLOG NETWORK (Jan. 25, 2017), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-
blog/the-war-on-facts-is-a-war-on-democracy/. 
48. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: 
HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH, 128–79 (2008) 
(drawing on public record to describe systematic actions to discredit scientists 
and their research and examining how scientists have been mistreated). 
49. Brad Plumer & Coral Davenport, Science Under Attack: How Trump 
Is Sidelining Researchers and Their Work, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/climate/trump-administration-war-on-
science.html (noting that, though previous administrations have disregarded 
scientific evidence to varying degrees, the scope of such disregard under 
President Trump is much wider). 
50. Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, Organized Climate Change 
Denial, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 144–45 
(John S. Dryzek et al. eds., 2011) (detailing global attacks on science and 
finding that when “[v]iewed through a broader theoretical lens, climate change 
denial can be seen as part of a more sweeping effort to defend the modern 
Western social order, which has been built by an industrial capitalism powered 
by fossil fuels”). 
51. The quotes are from Professor Michael Gerrard, who stated, “[t]he 
disregard for expertise in the federal government is worse than it’s ever been.”  
Plumer & Davenport, supra note 49. 
52. See id. 
53. Emily Berman & Jacob Carter, Policy Analysis: Scientific Integrity in 
Federal Policymaking Under Past and Present Administrations, 13 J. SCI. 
POL’Y & GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2018). 
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government.54 
Examples of particular administrative actions that 
undermine climate science are abound.55  Attempts to remove 
scientific evidence on climate change from the EPA’s web page 
were among the first steps taken by the Trump administration.56  
In addition, the administration altered the parameters of 
estimations made by the United States Geological Survey office, 
eliminating the projected effects of increased carbon dioxide 
pollution after 2040.57  Further examples of administrative 
fettering of science include the removal of worst-case scenario 
projections from the National Climate Assessment, an 
interagency report produced every four years,58 and attacks on 
climate science within the EPA’s proposed new rule on science,59 
 
54. See, e.g., Sabin Center for Climate Change Law & the Legal Defense 
Fund, Silencing Science Tracker, COLUM. L. SCH., 
https://climate.law.columbia.edu/Silencing-Science-Tracker (last visited Mar. 
1, 2021) (displaying, since November 2016, a comprehensive list of actions 
which may adversely impact science, including measures from federal, state, 
and local governments as well as their agencies). 
55. Arlota, supra note 46 (discussing the war on science and how 
President Trump’s attacks undermine cost-benefit analysis). 
56. Valerie Volcovici, Trump Administration Tells EPA to Cut Climate 




57. The Trump administration likely chose to do so due to the effects of 
global warming becoming particularly severe after 2050.  See Coral Davenport 
& Mark Landler, Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate 
Science, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trump-climate-science.html. 
58. Philip B. Duffy (the then-president of the Woods Hole Research Center 
who served on a National Academy of Sciences panel that reviewed the 
government’s most recent National Climate Assessment) stated: “What we 
have here is a pretty blatant attempt to politicize the science—to push the 
science in a direction that’s consistent with their politics . . . It reminds me of 
the Soviet Union.”  Id. 
59. For the original proposed rule, see ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY: SCIENCE ADVISOR PROGRAMS, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY IN 
REGULATORY SCIENCE PROPOSAL (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/osa/strengthening-transparency-regulatory-science.  
More recently, an editorial by one of the most prestigious scientific publications 
called the updated rule’s supposed ability to increase transparency misleading 
and strongly criticized it.  Editorial, The Sustained Undermining of Science by 
the EPA’s Leaders Is a Travesty, NATURE (May 5, 2020), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01310-y. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/3
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which was overwhelmingly opposed by scientific groups.60  Legal 
experts also vocally opposed these developments: 100 
environmental and administrative law professors signed a letter 
urging the EPA to withdraw this revisited rule, as it does not 
foster science.61 
B. Direction of Agencies to Neglect GHG Emissions, Licensing 
of Pipelines, and Undue Delay of Regulation Issuance 
President Trump directed agencies to review (modify, 
suspend, or rescind) regulations that may “unduly burden” 
energy development—including those aimed at reducing GHG 
emissions.62  Likewise, President Trump made previous 
standards concerning the grant of licenses for pipelines and 
then-existing state powers in the Clean Water Act much more 
flexible.63  In addition, President Trump reversed previous 
decisions by President Obama and ultimately authorized the 
Dakota Access and Keystone XL oil pipelines.64  Litigation 
ensued and is still ongoing.65  Recently, the Dakota Access 
 
60. Lisa Friedman, Coronavirus Doesn’t Slow Trump’s Regulatory 
Rollbacks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/climate/coronavirus-environmental-
regulations-trump.html. 
61. Emmett Inst. on Climate Change & the Env., Comment on 
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“SNPRM”)—Strengthening 
Transparency in Regulatory Science: 85 Fed. Reg. 15396, 1−2 (May 18, 2020), 
https://legal-planet.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Law-Profs-EPA-HQ-OA-
2018-0259-Comment-FINAL-5-17-20.pdf (arguing that the EPA lacks the 
authority to issue such a rule and that the proposal “bears no relationship to 
widely-accepted principle and procedures of scientific review”); see Climate 
Science Legal Defense Fund & Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, 
Comments on the Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding 
EPA’s Proposed Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science Rule 
(Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OA-2018-0259) (May 18, 2020), 
https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/CSLDF%20Sabin
%20Comments%20on%20EPA%20Science%20Transparency%20Rule.pdf. 
62. Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017). 
63. Exec. Order No. 13868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 10, 2019). 
64. Cat Schuknecht, Trump Signs Executive Orders in Push to Make It 
Easier to Build Oil and Gas Pipelines, NPR (Apr. 11, 2019, 9:48 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/11/712121425/trump-signs-executive-orders-in-
push-to-make-it-easier-to-build-oil-and-gas-pipe. 
65. See, e.g., N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 20-
35412, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 16987, at *4 (9th Cir. May 28, 2020) (denying 
the federal administration’s request to stay a previous decision revoking 
essential construction permits on wetlands and other bodies of water). 
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Pipeline has been shut down by a district court, a decision that 
was motivated by a finding of insufficient environmental review 
(technically, an environmental impact statement—“EIS”);66 on 
the same day, the Supreme Court of the United States denied 
the Trump administration and ET Energy authorization to 
pursue the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline despite the 
pending legal cases that involve it.67 
These rulings show how hasty administrative decisions can 
be costly, both in the realm of carbon emissions and in that of 
litigation.  Market forces, due to the costs of litigation and 
uncertainty, responded unfavorably to the President’s “drill, 
baby, drill” approach,68 and developers gave up building the 
Atlantic Coast Pipeline for good.69  In spite of such reactions, the 
combination of the two executive orders shows that the 
President is directing agencies to focus on potential immediate 
economic benefits as opposed to giving weight to long-term 
considerations regarding the economy, health, and the 
environment.  These executive orders are likely to be 
detrimental to health and the environment across the country 
and will contribute to a significant increase in GHG emissions.  
These emissions, in turn, will aggravate the current climate and 
COVID-19 crises. 
Likewise, the delay of additional regulations by the Trump 
administration’s Department of Energy has contributed to an 
increase in GHG emissions from power plants, as well as an 
elevated output of mercury and other harmful pollutants.70  The 
 
66. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 471 F. 
Supp. 3d 71, 76–77 (D.D.C. July 6, 2020). The decision is available at: 
https://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/standing_rock_sioux_tribe_v._a
rmy_corps_of_engineers.pdf.  Interestingly, Judge Boasberg weighed economic 
costs of the decision in light of the environmental concerns, concluding that the 
merely economic considerations presented by the U.S Corps of Engineers and 
Dakota Access were not sufficient to outweigh these concerns.  Id. at 18–24. 
67. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. N. Plains Res. Council, No. 19A1053, 
2020 U.S. LEXIS 3545, at *1 (U.S. July 6, 2020) (order granting partial vacatur 
and an injunction). 
68. The expression was coined at the 2008 Republican National 
Convention in St. Paul, Minn. by Michael Steele, the former lieutenant 
governor of Maryland.  Josh Kurtz, “Drill, baby, drill!” Almost Didn’t Happen, 
E&E NEWS (Aug. 29, 2012), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059969331. 
69. Kevin Dietsch, Developers Abandon the Atlantic Coast Pipeline for 
Good, NRDC (July 6, 2020), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/nrdc/developers-
abandon-atlantic-coast-pipeline-good. 
70. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 10−11 (highlighting that the DOE, under 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/3
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policies, had they not been delayed, could have ameliorated 
these environmental conditions and saved energy instead of 
ultimately contributing to the COVID-19 health crisis. 
C. The New Legal Framework of the Clean Air Act 
There are significant flaws in the cost-benefit analysis71 of 
the new rule addressing the scope of waters federally regulated 
under the Clean Air Act.72  Among the methodological flaws, the 
EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers unreasonably fail to 
estimate the majority of the proposed rule’s social harms while 
grossly undervaluing the few harms listed.73  The refusal of the 
EPA to enact stricter standards for national ambient quality, 
despite the recommendations of its own scientists,74 neglects the 
findings of recent scientific studies on the importance of air 
 
President Trump, failed to take actions on several energy efficient standards 
for consumer and commercial appliances and reversed course on light bulb 
standards, among others. Similar actions happened at the Department of 
Transportation and Occupational exposures.). 
71. Derrick Z. Jackson, The EPA’s Dirty Water: New Rule Discards 
Science, Ignores Importance of Wetlands and Tributaries, UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Apr. 25, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://blog.ucsusa.org/derrick-jackson/the-epas-dirty-water-new-rule-
discards-science-ignores-importance-of-wetlands-and-tributaries 
(highlighting that all the major scientific societies and the administration’s 
own Science Advisory Board warned the EPA that the agency did not 
incorporate the “best available science” on Navigable Waters). 
72. The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the 
United States,” 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 
pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401). 
73. Bethany A. Davis Noll et al., Beneath the Surface: The Concealed Costs 




74. EPA’S OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS (OAQPS), 
POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY 
STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, EXTERNAL REVIEW DRAFT (Sept. 5, 2019), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-
09/documents/draft_policy_assessment_for_pm_ naaqs_09-05-2019.pdf (“[A] 
conclusion that the current primary PM2.5 standards do provide adequate 
public health protection would place little weight on the broad body of 
epidemiologic evidence reporting generally positive and statistically 
significant health effect associations, particularly for PM2.5 air quality 
distributions likely to have been allowed by the current primary standards. . . 
.”); id. at 3–98. 
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quality to health outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic.75  
Under the Clean Air Act,76 the EPA must review the criteria 
every five years.77  Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the EPA 
announced that it would continue with the same standards for 
so-called particulate matter (PM2.5) that were determined in 
2012.78  Importantly, particulate matter has been associated 
with a higher rate of COVID-19 infection and lethality.79 
In this delicate scenario, the EPA opted to continue with the 
12-μg/m3 standard, despite its own findings that a stricter 
standard of about 9-μg/m3 would present a risk reduction of 21–
27% and save up to approximately 12,150 lives per year.80  
Public health experts were vocal in opposing the EPA’s decision 
because it “defies scientific research.”81  Surely, regarding 
uncertainties about the science, the statutory standard 
requiring an “adequate margin of safety” should point to more 
stringent standards, not the opposite.82  This is especially the 
case in light of the pandemic. 
Importantly, in a study published in 2020 (and authored by 
 
75. Xiao Wu et al., Exposure to Air Pollution and COVID-19 Mortality in 
the United States: A Nationwide Cross-Sectional Study, MEDRXIV (Apr. 27, 
2020), https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/covid-
pm/files/pm_and_covid_mortality_med.pdf. 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (determines the establishment, review, and revision 
of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards—NAAQS). 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1). 
78. EPA Proposes to Retain NAAQS for Particulate Matter, EPA (Apr. 14, 
2020), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-retain-naaqs-
particulate-matter. 
79. Leonardo Setti et al., Rapid Response: Is There a Plausible Role for 
Particulate Matter in the Spreading of COVID-19 in Northern Italy?, BMJ (Apr. 
8, 2020), https://www.bmj.com/content/368/bmj.m1103/rr. 
80. POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR 
QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, EXTERNAL REVIEW DRAFT, supra 
note 74, at 3−91.  The number resulted from calculating 27% of the 45,000 total 
deaths estimated to occur under the current standard. 
81. Coral Davenport, ‘Unbelievable’ Timing: As Coronavirus Rages, 
Trump Disregards Advice to Tighten Clean Air Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/climate/coronavirus-soot-clean-
air-regulations.html. 
82. Seth Jaffe, EPA Remains the “Anti-Environmental Protection Agency”; 
Wheeler Refuses to Tighten the PM2.5 NAAQS, L. &  ENV’T (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.lawandenvironment.com/2020/04/15/epa-remains-the-anti-
environmental-protection-agency-wheeler-refuses-to-tighten-the-pm-2-5-
naaqs/ (citing Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) as a landmark 
case determining that the EPA should be prepared to regulate despite 
uncertainty if it is to fulfill its mission to protect the public). 
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the former members of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory 
Committee), the scientific evidence is conclusive: the EPA’s new 
standard is insufficient and particularly harmful to minorities.83  
This, of course, is conspicuously worrisome from a climate-
justice standpoint in a moment when the populace of the United 
States is calling for equality on all fronts.  It is also concerning 
in light of the scientific standard of using the best evidence 
available, as additional studies have shown that more stringent 
standards for PM2.5 (namely, a 10-μg/m3 standard) would save 
more than 143,000 lives in a decade.84 
The EPA’s decision to maintain the 2012 standard denies 
science, imposes high costs upon the wellbeing of the U.S. 
population, contributes to avoidable deaths, increases air 
pollution, and favors the conditions in which COVID-19 can 
aggressively spread and lead to critical outcomes.85  A similar 
effect will be caused by the EPA’s proposed rule to regulate 
carbon GHG emissions from aircraft, which was hurriedly issued 
to avoid a lawsuit against the EPA for lack of regulation under 
the Clean Air Act.86 
D. The Repeal of the Clean Power Plan and Related Threats to 
Air Quality 
The Trump administration intends to repeal the Clean 
Power Plan, 87 which is crucial to the achievement of U.S. 
 
83. Independent Particulate Matter Review Panel, The Need for a Tighter 
Particulate-Matter Air-Quality Standard, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 680, 681−82 
(June 10, 2020), 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMsb2011009?articleTools=true. 
84. X. Wu et al., Evaluating the Impact of Long-Term Exposure to Fine 
Particulate Matter on Mortality Among the Elderly, 6 SCI. ADVANCES, 1 (2020). 
85. See Damian Carrington, Is Air Pollution Making the Coronavirus 
Pandemic Even More Deadly?, GUARDIAN (May 4, 2020, 2:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/04/is-air-pollution-making-the-
coronavirus-pandemic-even-more-deadly (highlighting the connection between 
exposure to air pollution, which damages lungs and hearts, and the increased 
likelihood of being more severely affected). 
86. See Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Proposes Airplane Emission Standards 
that Airlines Already Meet, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/climate/airplanes-climate-change.html 
(noting that the standards were issued to benefit the U.S. aircraft industry’s 
international sales as the proposed rule adopts a United Nations basic 
standard from 2016). 
87. FACT SHEET: PROPOSAL TO REPEAL THE CLEAN POWER PLAN, EPA 
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contributions as determined by the Paris Agreement.88  This 
policy decision illustrates another instance of the Trump 
administration’s complete disregard for the totality of costs 
involved in its deregulatory action.89  More specifically, the EPA 
currently claims that the repeal will save $33 billion in 
compliance costs through 2030.90  This calculation, however, has 
been disputed.91  Other recent changes relating to this cost-
benefit analysis are also dubious.92  The choice by the EPA to 
rely on estimations that ignored key health benefits93 has led to 
recent litigation with the goal of halting rollback of the Clean 
Power Plan.94 
A proposed rule that will loosen limits on mercury emissions 
from power plants will likely have similar effects.95  This 
deregulatory action has also been subject to severe criticism 
regarding the computation of benefits, with its cost-benefit 




88. Anna McGinn, Understanding the Paris Agreement, SCHOLARS 
STRATEGY NETWORK (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://scholars.org/contribution/understanding-paris-agreement. 
89. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., VALUING CLIMATE DAMAGES: 
UPDATING ESTIMATION OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON DIOXIDE 51 (2017) 
(ebook). 
90. EPA, supra note 87. 
91. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., supra note 89, at 51 (disputing 
the administration’s focus on domestic contributions instead of considering the 
global impact of emissions and climate change); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 
42, at 159 (contending the change from global to domestic emissions is 
unjustified as “the height of arbitrariness”). 
92. The EPA’s fact sheet acknowledges other changes that differ from the 
Obama administration, namely: domestic costs are no longer compared to 
domestic benefits and energy efficiency is no longer viewed as a benefit, but 
rather as an avoided cost showing “the true magnitude of the CPP’s [(Clean 
Power Plan’s)] costs.”  EPA, supra note 87. 
93. Dan Farber, The Flight from Evidence-Based Regulation, 
LEGALPLANET (Mar. 19, 2020), https://legal-planet.org/2020/03/19/the-flight-
from-evidence-based-regulation/. 
94. See, e.g., Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
95. See MEMORANDUM ON COMPLIANCE COST, HAP BENEFITS, AND 
ANCILLARY CO-POLLUTANT BENEFITS FOR “NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR 
HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS: COAL-AND OIL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM 
GENERATING UNITS—RECONSIDERATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL FINDING AND 
RESIDUAL RISK AND TECHNOLOGY REVIEW,” EPA (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-12/documents/mats-an-cost-
benefit_memo12-2018.pdf. 
96. Farber, supra note 93. 
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rollback of the Clean Power Plan and the proposed mercury 
emission rule are likely to negatively impact both health and the 
environment, and will specifically contribute to an increase in 
GHG emissions. 
E. The Flexibilization of the National Environmental Policy 
Act 
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), which 
was created by the Nixon Administration in 1970, is a 
foundational law for environmental protection in the United 
States.97  As such, it is perhaps no surprise that it was a target 
for the deregulatory efforts of the Trump administration; the 
Council of Environmental Quality, ostensibly aiming at 
enhancing efficiency and fostering economic growth, proposed to 
reform NEPA.98  A key aspect of NEPA ensures that 
“unquantified” environmental values are considered throughout 
the decision-making process, which includes weighing the costs 
and benefits of every major action that might significantly 
impact the environment.99 
Among the main modifications proposed by the Trump 
administration is elimination of the consideration of cumulative 
and indirect impacts such as climate change; the proposed rule 
clearly promotes the usage of expedited decisions at the expense 
of federal environmental reviews.100  The proposed rule not only 
 
97. Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of 
United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First 
Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENV’T L.J. 75, 76–77 (2001) 
(emphasizing how environmental-protection law was “essentially nonexistent” 
in the United States before 1970 and that the NEPA was signed into law on 
the first day of that year). 
98. See Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural 
Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 1684 
(proposed Jan. 10, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500, 1501, 1502, 1503, 
1504, 1505, 1507, 1508).  This proposal was updated on July 16, 2020, when 
the CEQ issued its final rule maintaining the CEQ previous proposed rule. For 
the final rule, which as of this writing and until September 14, 2020, is still 
subject to congressional review.  See also Update to the Regulations 
Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (July 16, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500, 
1501, 1502, 1503, 1504, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1508, 1515, 1516, 1517, 1518). 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B). 
100. Joseph DeQuarto, Landmark Environmental Rules Slated for 
Overhaul, REGULATORY REV. (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/02/18/dequarto-landmark-environmental-
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sets stricter deadlines on the environmental-review process, but 
also allows private entities to review such decisions in place of 
federal agencies, and significantly reduces the scope of both 
federal actions that would trigger review under NEPA and the 
public-comment process.101  Therefore, the proposed rule can be 
considered to implement unreasoned modifications that 
jeopardize policy assessments, as it reduces deadlines and 
exempts projects from NEPA review, removing significant public 
participation at a time when the nation is calling for inclusion 
and equality.  The proposed rule is also likely to hasten approval 
of projects with significant environmental impact, which may 
contribute to GHG emissions and deteriorate air quality. 
F. The Rollback of Regulations Promoting Fuel Efficiency 
The U.S. EPA’s proposed rule on unifying fuel-economy 
standards102 has sparked criticism103 because it is estimated to 
cost more than $400 billion by 2050 and may increase GHGs 
related to transportation emissions by ten percent.104  Key 
industry actors have vowed to follow California’s more stringent 
standards,105 and have faced investigations by the Justice 
 
rules-slated-overhaul/. 
101. See id. 
102. Final Rule: One National Program on Federal Preemption of State 
Fuel Economy Standards, EPA (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/final-rule-
one-national-program-federal-preemption-state. 
103. Consumer Reports shows that the proposed rule would be too costly 
and, significantly, would not offer the security improvements that the 
president has claimed.  See Chris Harto et al., The Un-SAFE Rule: How a Fuel-
Economy Rollback Costs Americans Billions in Fuel Savings and Does Not 




104. Megan Mahajan, Trump’s Clean Car Rollback Will Cost up to $400 




105. Hiroko Tabuchi, States Sue to Block Trump from Weakening Fuel 
Economy Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/climate/lawsuit-fuel-economy-
climate.html (emphasizing that the auto industry is split over the measure, 
but Ford, Honda, BMW, and Volkswagen are against the rollback). 
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Department, allegedly in retaliation for opposing President 
Trump.106  California, twenty-two other states, and the cities of 
Los Angeles and New York are suing the administration for the 
revocation of California’s standards.107  The cost-benefit analysis 
of the Clean Car Standards almost exclusively uses co-benefits 
to justify the EPA’s proposed deregulation.108 The Clean Car 
deregulatory measures have also underestimated climate 
damage through use of an arbitrary calculation of the social cost 
of carbon.109 
The administration’s own estimates acknowledge that the 
rollback of car standards could range from a $22 billion net cost 
for society to net benefits of $6.4 billion.110  This wide range is 
the result of using different discount rates: if a three percent 
discount rate is used (the typical rate used by the federal 
government), the new rule will be costly; it will have net benefits 
 
106. Catherine Rampell, Trump is All About Deregulation—Except When 
It Comes to His Enemies, WASH. POST (May 28, 2020, 7:28 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-is-all-about-deregulation--
except-when-it-comes-to-his-enemies/2020/05/28/dcfb9638-a116-11ea-b5c9-
570a91917d8d_story.html (highlighting how the administration has “cook[ed] 
the books” on its cost-benefit analysis and how the President’s deregulatory 
agenda was never about maximizing the interest of the country but was 
intended to reward friends and punish enemies). 
107. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, California v. 
Chao, No. 1:19-cv-02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019).  An additional lawsuit that 
has been filed by California and thirteen other states challenges the “Safer 
Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” published at 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 
2020), and “Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for 
Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicles,” published at 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077 
(Apr. 13, 2018).  See also California v. Wheeler, No. 20-1357 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 
14, 2020). 
108. Richard L. Revesz, Trump Shows his Cards on Environmental 
Protections—Or a Lack Thereof, HILL (Apr. 30, 2020, 6:30 PM), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/495457-trump-shows-his-
cards-on-environmental-protections-or-lack-thereof. 
109. Key Economic Errors in the Clean Car Standards Rollback, N.Y.U. 
INST. POL’Y INTEGRITY 1, 2 (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://policyintegrity.org/files/media/Vehicles_Emissions_Rollback_-
_Key_Economic_Errors.pdf (discussing additional faults of the EPA’s cost-
benefit analysis). 
110. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. & EPA, FINAL 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT 
(SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL YEAR 2021–2026 PASSENGER CARS AND 
LIGHT TRUCKS, (Mar. 30, 2020), 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/final_safe_fria_web
_version_200330.pdf (for three and seven percent discount rates, respectively). 
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only if a seven percent discount rate is used.111  Litigation is 
poised to proceed.  The Second Circuit reversed an earlier 
district-court decision, ruling that the EPA shall disclose the 
components of its model for the evaluation of GHG vehicle 
standards.112  The legal system, so far, has been unconvinced by 
the justifications provided by the administration and are acting 
as a check on potential threats to environmental protection and 
increasing GHG emissions. 
G. The Flexibilization of Regulatory Standards and Overall 
Enforcement during COVID-19 
Another deregulatory measure implemented by the Trump 
administration that may negatively impact climate change, 
while neglecting proper cost considerations, is the flexibilization 
of regulatory standards and enforcement that agencies might 
consider in order to encourage economic recovery in the 
aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.  This deregulatory action, 
which was implemented by an executive order,113 appears to 
grant agencies the discretion to limit enforcement actions to 
willful violations.  If this is the case, this measure is likely to be 
more difficult to challenge in courts, as it falls within 
administrative discretion.114 
Despite such discretion, litigation is expected to occur.  The 
EPA’s initial guidance implementing such flexibilization will be 
 
111. Coral Davenport, Trump Calls New Fuel Economy Rule a Boon. Some 
Experts See Steep Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/climate/trump-pollution-rollback.html. 
112. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 954 F.3d 150, 157 n.6 (2d Cir. 2020) 
(noting that the deliberations were already disclosed). 
113. Exec. Order No. 13924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,353 (May 22, 2020). 
Technically, this Executive Order, which was called the Executive Order on 
Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery, directs heads of federal 
agencies to temporarily or permanently relax or remove regulations that may 
impede economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic.  Id. 
114. Seth D. Jaffe, Has President Trump Just Limited Enforcement to 
Willful Violations?, MONDAQ, (June 4, 2020), 
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/environmental-law/947236/has-
president-trump-just-limited-enforcement-to-willful-violations (defining this 
order as the most significant deregulatory measure taken by the Trump 
administration). 
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short-lived,115 as it is to be terminated by August 31, 2020.116  
Nonetheless, the majority of facilities that are impacted by such 
rollback are likely to report their emissions on the Toxic Release 
Inventory (“TRI”), a database maintained by the EPA on 
industrial and federal facilities.117  There are more than 21,800 
such facilities nationwide, and, in 2016, more than two-thirds of 
the U.S. population resided in the same zip code as an 
operational TRI site.118  A study conducted by scientists at the 
American University found that, during the rollback, these 
facilities actually increased pollution, which may have 
subsequently increased the conditional daily COVID-19 death 
rate by 10.5% and the case rate by 53.7%.119  Experts have noted 
that this sector is behaving opportunistically and that the EPA’s 
guidance regarding factory pollution does not require 
assessment of the potential impact of increased pollution on 
public health that is already jeopardized by COVID-19.120 
Accordingly, the flexibilization of regulatory standards and 
related enforcement, which was done hastened and in patent 
disregard of costs, is likely to contribute to the increase of GHG 
emission and overall pollution.  This is the case, as industries 
and market actors may have taken advantage of the lack of 
enforcement, interpreting it as a free pass to pollute, in practice. 
H. Contextualizing the Findings of the Previous Sections 
This Section has presented the attacks on climate science 
that are likely to negatively affect both GHG emissions and the 
 
115. Susan Parker Bodine, COVID-19 Implications for EPA’s Enforcement 
and Compliance Assurance Program, EPA (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-
03/documents/oecamemooncovid19implications.pdf. 
116. Susan Parker Bodine, COVID-19 Implications for EPA’s Enforcement 
and Compliance Assurance Program: Addendum on Termination, EPA (June 
29, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-
06/documents/covid19addendumontermination.pdf. 
117. Claudia L. Persico & Kathryn R. Johnson, The Effects of Increased 
Pollution on COVID-19 Cases and Deaths 3 (June 22, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3633446. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 29. 
120. Rena Steinzor, The Pandemic and Industry Opportunism, 
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overall outcomes of COVID-19.  Additionally, it has discussed 
significant deregulatory climate policies that have been 
proposed by the Trump administration and are likely to 
negatively impact the environment and public health.  On both 
fronts, it is clear that the deregulatory climate measures 
proposed by the Trump administration disregard the best 
available science, including the social cost of carbon, despite 
being required to consider both.121  This implementation without 
proper assessment of science and cost considerations will have 
significant consequences, not only for the current health and 
climate crises, but also for the economic crisis that will likely 
follow the pandemic. 
The findings of this Section are coherent with previous work 
that found consistent disdain for regulatory science throughout 
the Trump administration.122  The President’s disdain for 
science has perhaps never been more evident than in his 
handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, during which he 
monopolized briefings by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (“CDC”) and politicized medical advice in an 
unprecedented fashion.123  His actions during the pandemic, 
which often contradict the advice of his own technical experts, 
have led to both national and international criticism.124  
Moreover, the Trump administration’s deregulatory actions 
have not only neglected scientific knowledge, but they also are 
consistently dismissive of best regulatory practices and the 
 
121. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, “REGULATORY 
ANALYSIS,” (Sept. 17, 2003), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-
4.pdf; see also Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,095 (Mar. 31, 2017) 
(requiring consideration of best scientific evidence available and social cost of 
carbon). 
122. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, President Trump’s War on Regulatory Science, 
43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 247, 301–02 (2019). 
123. See generally Steve Coll, The Meaning of Donald Trump’s 
Coronavirus Quackery, NEW YORKER (Mar. 29, 2020), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/04/06/the-meaning-of-donald-
trumps-coronavirus-quackery (describing how the President considered 
reopening the country by Easter, against the recommendation of health 
experts, because he thought “it was a beautiful time”). 
124. See Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer, Trump’s Response to Virus 
Reflects a Long Disregard for Science, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/climate/trump-coronavirus-climate-
science.html (including ridicule when the President suggested that injecting 
disinfectants might be helpful). 
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normative use of economics.125  The administration’s 
deregulatory measures also conflict with the long-held 
assumption that cost-benefit analysis is an effective method 
through which to determine the maximization of overall 
wellbeing.126 
These findings are also aligned with previous literature, 
which contends that the administration’s policies have 
discredited cost-benefit analysis, ultimately turning it into a 
“perversion of a neutral approach to policymaking.”127  An 
illustrative example of this trend is the Trump administration’s 
support for coal producers, which has provided incentives for the 
continued production of a source of energy that is both inefficient 
and the worst contributor to GHG emissions.128 
In the aggregate, all of the deregulatory climate actions 
pursued by the Trump administration and analyzed in this 
Section will negatively impact air quality and increase GHG 
emissions.  To put these deregulatory measures in perspective: 
two major actions of the current administration, continuance of 
the particulate matter standard and the rollback of the Clean 
Power Plan, could lead to more than 90,000 deaths.129  Although 
this is less than the current death toll of the COVID-19 
pandemic in the United States,130 the total effect of all the 
rollbacks pursued by the Trump administration may well 
surpass the number of deaths caused by the virus.  Accordingly, 
 
125. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 402−03 (7th ed. 
2007) (noting that the cost-benefit analysis as a regulatory tool has different 
meanings that range from the normative use of economics to using the criterion 
of wealth maximization when evaluating a particular policy). 
126. See generally ADLER & POSNER, supra note 40, at 62. 
127. Rena Steinzor, Cost-Benefit Analysis According to the Trump 
Administration, REGULATORY REV. (July 23, 2019), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/23/steinzor-cost-benefit-analysis-
according-trump-administration/. 
128. For information on the carbon impact of coal in relation to other 
sources, see infra Figure 1, in the Appendix. 
129. See Dan Farber, Trump’s EPA May Cause as Many U.S. Deaths as 
the Coronavirus, LEGALPLANET (Apr. 20, 2020), https://legal-
planet.org/2020/04/20/could-trumps-epa-cause-as-many-american-deaths-as-
the-coronavirus/ (arguing that although President Trump’s measures are more 
gradual, deregulation can be as deadly as the pandemic). 
130. The official death count in the United States through March 2, 2021, 
is 513,122.  United States COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by State, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/us-cases-
deaths.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2021). 
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such climate policies do not maximize wellbeing.  Further, they 
will have a devastating economic impact due to the disregard of 
valid cost considerations related to the preservation of health 
and life, to the environment, and to the climate as a whole.  The 
consequences could not be more severe. 
III. THE MAIN CONSEQUENCES OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S CLIMATE 
POLICIES FOR THE PANDEMIC: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
PERSPECTIVE 
As established in Part II, the combination of the Trump 
administration’s attacks on climate science and related 
deregulatory policies contributes to an increase in pollution, 
including GHG emissions, that aggravates the consequences of 
COVID-19.  Part III discusses the Trump administration’s 
climate policies in the international arena with a focus upon 
analysis of a major deregulatory action that will negatively 
impact the pandemic: the United States’ withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement.  It also examines the withdrawal in the 
aftermath of the pandemic, focusing on principles of 
international law and state liability for environmental harms. 
This Part is premised upon the negative consequences of the 
Trump administration’s climate policies, especially regarding 
their impact on the country’s Nationally Determined 
Contribution (“NDC”) under the Paris Agreement131 and GHG 
emissions.132  The original U.S. NDC, which required only that 
the country continue its trend of reducing carbon emissions,133 
received criticism for its relatively timid target.134  The Trump 
 
131. See generally Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4(2) (“Each Party 
shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined 
contributions that it intends to achieve.  Parties shall pursue domestic 
mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such 
contributions.”). 
132. Id. at art. 2(b) (including among the goals of the Agreement: 
“Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and 
foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development”). 
133. See Dana Nuccitelli, Fact Check: China Pledged Bigger Climate 




134. See, e.g., Luke Kemp, Better Out Than In, 7 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 
458, 458 (2017). 
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administration, however, considered the NDC as an obstacle to 
economic growth, a belief that is illustrated by its repeal of the 
Clean Power Plan,135 which is crucial to achievement of the U.S. 
NDC.136  Though the NDCs are not mandatory targets, this 
disregard for the country’s NDC has raised alarm.137  From an 
international law perspective, NDCs were a minimum 
expectation, and some experts have been vocal about their 
insufficiency.138  While the United States has formally notified 
its intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement,139 the country 
remains a member of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).140 
So far, President Trump and the State Department have not 
pursued any formal efforts to withdraw from the UNFCCC.141  
Hence, the United States should continue to prioritize UNFCCC 
goals: protecting the climate system, considering climate change 
when formulating domestic policies, and remaining committed 
to combating the high concentration of GHGs.142 
 
135. See generally EPA, ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS: REPEALING 
THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: PROPOSAL (2017), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/fs-proposed-
repeal-cpp-final_oct10.pdf. 
136. See generally McGinn, supra note 88 (explaining that NDC 
contributions by the U.S. were based “almost entirely on the Clean Power 
Plan”). 
137. NDCs are voluntary targets determined by each country.  See 
generally The Paris Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, U.N. (Sept. 12, 
2016), https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/09/the-paris-
agreement-faqs/. 
138. Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and Human Trafficking After 
the Paris Agreement, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 345, 353–54 (2018). 
139. On November 4, 2019, the United States served notice of the 
withdrawal on the first date possible under the Paris Agreement.  Lisa 
Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-
agreement-climate.html. 
140. To confirm that the United States remains a party to the UNFCCC 
treaty, visit United Nations Climate Change, https://unfccc.int/process/parties-
non-party-stakeholders/parties-convention-and-observer-states (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2021). 
141. Wentz & Gerrard, supra note 17, at 63. 
142. UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 2-4, at 9–15. 
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A. The United States’ Withdrawal from Paris is Likely to 
Negatively Impact the COVID-19 Crisis 
Given the nature of the emissions and amount of pollution 
that will be caused by the Trump administration’s attacks on 
climate science and deregulatory climate policies, there will be 
significant impacts beyond U.S. borders.  This Section 
articulates law, economic concepts, and methodologies from an 
international perspective.  It is principled on the notion that 
“Preventing all harm” “[is not] socially desirable,” as it will be 
“too costly” for all nations.143  Accordingly, and because the 
negative effects of climate change have major consequences for 
“the environment that fall[] outside the jurisdiction of individual 
states (and . . . [might not be] owned by any natural or legal 
person),”144 law and economics (cost-benefit analysis, in 
particular) are frequently applied to determine the optimal 
levels of pollution and to minimize the impact upon people living 
in affected areas.  In this vein, the UNFCCC145 aims to avoid the 
dangerous effects of emissions but not to prohibit all emissions 
(as “the social costs would be too high”).146 
The Paris Agreement, often cited as the only effective 
institutional solution to climate change,147 also follows these 
premises.  It has been considered a historic breakthrough, as it 
marked the end of a decade-long stalemate over the full 
integration of the United States (and developing economies) into 
 
143. Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters, Liability and Climate Change, in 
OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 1, 2 (Hans Von Storch 
ed., 2019). 
144. Id. at 3. 
145. UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 2, at 9, determines the following: “The 
ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that 
the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.  Such a level should be 
achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” (emphasis 
added). 
146. Faure & Peeters, supra note 143, at 3. 
147. Mark Cooper, Governing the Global Climate Commons: The Political 
Economy of State and Local Action, After the U.S. Flip-Flop on the Paris 
Agreement, 118 ENERGY POL’Y 440, 441 (2018). 
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the climate regime.148  At this point, a technical note is required: 
this Article acknowledges, but dismisses, the controversy 
concerning the legal status of the Paris Agreement under U.S. 
law,149 as both the Obama and Trump administrations 
considered it an executive agreement.150  Under international 
law, however, the Paris Agreement is a treaty,151 and the United 
States is legally bound until the withdrawal becomes effective.152  
The justifications provided by the Trump administration to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement do not pass a close-scrutiny 
test, let alone a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that 
 
148. Meinhard Doelle, Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses, in THE 
PARIS AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 387 
(Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017) (highlighting the importance of engaging all 
parties in a global effort to respond effectively to climate change). 
149. U.S. domestic law on treaties is not trivial, because the terminology 
used in international law and U.S. domestic law differs.  Under international 
law, all written international agreements governed by international law are 
referred to as “treaties,” whereas in U.S. law, only some are labeled as such.  
According to U.S. law, the president has the power to sign a treaty, but it does 
not go into effect until it is ratified by two-thirds of the Senate.  U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2.  Executive agreements are international agreements concluded by 
the president under independent constitutional authority in his capacity as 
commander-in-chief, but these agreements are treaties for international law 
purposes.  BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (7th ed. 2018). 
150. See generally Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris 
Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENV’T L. 142 (2016).  The Department 
of State determined the Paris Agreement did not address substantive legal 
obligations beyond those stated in its parent treaty, the UNFCCC, supra note 
19, and concluded there was no need to submit it to the Senate.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, THE HANDBOOK ON TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: 
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (2001), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT-
106SPRT66922.pdf. 
151. Under international law, the Paris Agreement is unequivocally a 
treaty.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).  The United States signed the 
Paris Agreement on Apr. 22, 2016, and the treaty entered into force on Nov. 4, 
2016.  Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 20, at 24; see, e.g., Bodansky, supra 
note 150, at 142; cf. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, The Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change: Behind Closed Doors, GLOB. ENV’T POL. 1, 3 (2016). For purposes of 
this Article, this controversy is not determinative, because the United States 
is legally bound to the provisions of the agreement under international law, 
regardless of domestic determinations. Importantly, “international law makes 
clear that U.S. presidents cannot simply delete prior signatures from treaties.”  
KOH, supra note 20, at 40. 
152. According to the Paris Agreement, there is a three-year minimum 
period after its entry into force for parties to withdraw.  Paris Agreement, 
supra note 20, art. 28, at 25.  Hence, the U.S. can only effectively withdraw on 
November 4, 2020. 
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considers domestic and international factors.153  Cost-benefit 
analysis theorists have long defended respect for international 
law.154  In the case of the Paris Agreement, President Obama 
clearly understood that regulation (meaning, in this case, 
commitment to voluntary standards aiming at curbing carbon 
emissions) has a net benefit.155 
Under President Trump and in sharp contrast, climate 
science and regulations have been undermined in contemporary 
U.S. policy.  Under his leadership, U.S. policy has assumed that 
the country is free-riding, though novel research shows that the 
country will be among those hit the hardest by climate change.156  
This challenge will likely be further magnified by the aftermath 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically the economic crisis and 
potential rebound in emissions.  Moreover, such climate policies 
will likely increase the costs of doing business in the country, 
while removing economic opportunities that would have been 
generated if the administration had considered climate change 
and its consequences.157  Hence, the withdrawal does not 
maximize welfare; instead, it will almost certainly damage both 
the United States and the rest of the world.158 
The Paris withdrawal will ultimately enable the United 
States to emit more pollutants and reduce its mitigation costs 
 
153. For a detailed analysis, see Carolina Arlota, Does the United States’ 
Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change Pass the Cost-Benefit 
Analysis Test?, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 881, 907−34 (2020). 
154. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 185–86 (2005). 
155. See generally Barack Obama, The Irreversible Momentum of Clean 
Energy, 355 SCI. 126 (2017) (arguing the Paris Agreement is not a partisan 
issue, as it fosters the U.S. low emissions economy and its renewable energy 
industry and employment therein, maintaining U.S. competitiveness while 
enhancing the country’s climate security). 
156. Matthew E. Kahn et al., Long-Term Macroeconomic Effects of 
Climate Change: A Cross-Country Analysis, 5−32 (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper 19/215, 2019) (discussing the economic impact, specifically). 
157. See generally DONALD J. WUEBBLES ET AL., CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL 
REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (Linda O. Mearns et al. eds., 
2017) (arguing that the use of scientific information enabling people to prepare 
for climate change in advance can provide economic opportunities while 
proactively managing the risks, diminishing the negative effects and costs of 
climate change over time). 
158. Robert N. Stavins, Why Trump Pulled the U.S. Out of the Paris 
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while the country will begin “squeezing other countries’ emission 
space and raising their mitigation costs.”159  Game theory 
suggests that this opportunistic behavior by the Trump 
administration may lead to U.S. isolation and perhaps even 
retaliatory actions by other parties to the Paris Agreement.160  
World leaders, after all, will behave to avoid uncertainty and to 
avert granting opportunities to individual countries (including 
the United States) to tear apart international agreements.161 
Despite its free-riding policies, the weight of the United 
States on climate leadership remains significant.  The 
overwhelming majority of experts contend that the country’s 
leadership is crucial to expansion of climate action beyond the 
Paris Agreement.162  Moreover, the United States’ withdrawal is 
perceived as undermining the legitimacy of the Accord and the 
effectiveness of climate change governance.163  This is likely the 
case, as other countries who are (or will be) willing to commit to 
more stringent reductions in the upcoming rounds of their NDCs 
under the Paris Agreement may face increasing local opposition 
to global action on climate change after the U.S. withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement.164  At the other end of the spectrum, 
 
159. Zhang Hai-Bin et al., U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: 
Reasons, Impacts, and China’s Response, 8 ADVANCES CLIMATE CHANGE RSCH. 
220, 222 (2017). 
160. This argument assumes treaties are evidence of true cooperation 
among states, rather than representative of interests that coincide.  A related 
argument is that states would find themselves in a repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma or a coordination game.  A situation may also develop that involves 
the retaliation effect.  See Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary 
International Law: A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 143, 160–70 (2001). 
161. These claims are based on the economic assumptions that, other 
things being equal, human beings are reluctant to change (status quo bias) and 
are averse to the consequences of risk. For a renowned study on such concepts, 
see Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, 
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 193, 197–203 (1991). 
162. David G. Victor, Order from Chaos: America Exits the Climate Stage, 
BROOKINGS INST. (June 1, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2017/06/01/america-exits-the-climate-stage/. 
163. Hai-Bin et al., supra note 159, at 222. 
164. Because of the United States’ withdrawal, the European Union, 
China, and Canada face increased domestic opposition, despite being 
committed to the Paris Agreement.  Emre Peker, Around the World, Climate 
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the absence of the United States from the climate change arena 
provides additional incentives for other countries to behave 
strategically,165 and to refrain from more ambitious targets in 
their next NDCs. 
Recent actions by the Trump administration in the 
international sphere, such as the withdrawal from the World 
Health Organization (“WHO”) amid the coronavirus pandemic166 
and the United States’ obstructionism on environmental actions 
in the United Nations Summit on Global Climate 
Negotiations,167 are the opposite of a constructive leadership 
approach.  Furthermore, the President reiteratively undermines 
science, a habit that is particularly detrimental in the 
international sphere where science should foster cooperation 
among countries to protect the common good.168  These actions 
are disturbing because the United States’ constructive 
leadership is of paramount importance, as the ten years directly 
after the signing of the Paris Agreement are crucial to 
achievement of its targets.169  Nonetheless, due to sudden 
changes and accompanying uncertainties under President 
Trump, U.S. leadership in international climate and health 
matters is eroding.170  President Trump’s actions against 
 
165. Strategic thinking is defined as determining a particular course of 
action in relation to the behavior of the counterpart(s) involved.  “To illustrate, 
a player in American football often runs around the right side as a decoy to fool 
the other team while the player carrying the ball runs around the left side.  In 
contrast, a mountain climber never starts up the south slope as a decoy to fool 
the mountain while the main party ascends the north slope.  Football is 
strategic and mountain climbing is non-strategic.”  ROBERT D. COOTER, THE 
STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 31 (2000). 
166. Coronavirus: Trump Moves to Pull US Out of World Health 
Organization, BBC NEWS (July 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-
canada-53327906 (emphasizing that the withdrawal will only be effective on 
July 6, 2021, based on a 1948 Resolution of the United States Congress). 
167. Somini Sengupta, U.N. Climate Talks End with Few Commitments 
and a ‘Lost’ Opportunity, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/15/climate/cop25-un-climate-talks-
madrid.html (noting that the Madrid annual encounter of the Conference of 
Parties (“COP”) was one of the worst outcomes in the previous twenty-five 
years). 
168. David F. Cavers, Science and the Law Symposium: Introduction, 63 
MICH. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (1965). 
169. Hai-Bin et al., supra note 159, at 223. 
170. Cooper, supra note 147, at 450 (noting that the United States was 
unable to exert influence at COP 23 and is currently the only U.N. member 
who is soon to be out of the Paris Agreement). 
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international treaties jeopardize the whole system of 
international law and undermine the protection of human 
dignity, which is, after all, the “ultimate goal” of international 
law.171 
This scenario is particularly concerning not only for the 
United States’ reputation and leadership position, but also for 
the stigma that may arise out of such actions, as countries now 
have to counter the United States’ unfavorable climate policies 
and fund-damaging withdrawal from the WHO.172  It will also be 
against the maximization of overall wellbeing in the United 
States, as well as globally, because economics improving 
environmental quality is often connected to increasing marginal 
costs, which, in practice, means that the first steps are also the 
most cost-effective.173  It is noteworthy that law and economic 
theorists174 have argued that increased environmental 
performance (favored by stronger environmental regulations) 
leads to increased competitiveness among nations and 
industries—the so-called Porter hypothesis.175  Hence, the more 
a country considers the protection of health and the 
environment, the more wellbeing maximization occurs. 
In light of the discussion presented in this Section, it is clear 
that the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, 
coupled with the country’s deregulation of climate change 
measures that allowed for the treaty’s implementation, will 
contribute to an increase in GHG emissions beyond U.S. borders, 
as well as to overall adverse climate change impacts.  The 
following Section overviews this withdrawal, focusing on climate 
change liability in the context of President Trump’s recent 
claims for China to be held internationally accountable for 
COVID-19 damages. 
 
171. PATRICIA PARK, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ENERGY AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 3 (2d ed. 2013). 
172. Coronavirus: Trump Moves to Pull US Out of World Health 
Organization, supra note 166 (highlighting that the United States’ withdrawal 
threatens the agency’s financial viability, as the country contributes 15% of the 
WHO’s budget). 
173. Livermore et al., supra note 34, at 5. 
174. MICHAEL G. FAURE & ROY A. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 229 (2019). 
175. Michael E. Porter, America’s Green Strategy, 264 SCI. AM. 168 (1991). 
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B. The U.S. Withdrawal and Liability in the Wake of the 
Pandemic: An Overview of International Law Framework 
President Trump has been quite vocal in attributing 
responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemic to China.176  
Meanwhile, the Trump administration, due to its disdain for 
science and its political bias, failed to follow the National 
Security Council’s guidance on pandemics (created by President 
Obama).177  Importantly, the provisions often cited to establish 
state responsibility for China’s actions, namely Article 1 of the 
International Law Commission (“ILC”) on State Responsibility 
and customary law, 178 are similar to those for international 
environmental harm.  In this vein, this Section overviews the 
main arguments around and challenges related to climate 
change liability that were catalyzed by the U.S. withdrawal from 
the Paris Agreement. 
Such liability is based on various premises.  First, from a 
human rights perspective: international human rights bodies 
have consistently contended that environmental harms can 
adversely affect the enjoyment of human rights.179  The right to 
life, for instance, can be threatened by natural events attributed 
to climate change, including floods, storms, droughts, hunger, 
malnutrition, scarcity of water, and proliferation of tropical 
diseases like malaria; the right to housing is also threatened by 
 
176. Donald G. McNeil, Jr. & Andrew Jacobs, Blaming China for the 
Pandemic, Trump Says the U.S. Will Leave the W.H.O, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/health/virus-who.html. 
177. See Exec. Office of the President of the United States, Playbook for 
Early Response to High-Consequence Emerging Infectious Disease Threats and 
Biological Incidents (document not for public distribution, 2016), available at 
Dan Diamond & Nahal Toosi, Trump Team Failed to Follow NSC’s Pandemic 
Playbook, POLITICO (Mar. 25, 2020, 8:00 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/25/trump-coronavirus-national-
security-council-149285. 
178. See Henning Lahmann, Does China Really Owe the World Trillions 
of Dollars?, LAWFARE (May 7, 2020, 1:58 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-china-really-owe-world-trillions-dollars.  In 
addition to such provisions, response to the pandemic has specific 
determinations under Articles 6 and 7 of the 2005 World Health Organization 
International Health Regulations that require notification of a state within 24 
hours of outbreak.  Id. 
179. John H. Knox, Human Rights Principles and Climate Change, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 217 (Cinnamon P. 
Carlarne et al. eds., 2016). 
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forced misplacement and other environmental factors.180  
“Because climate change is a type of environmental harm,” 
human rights obligations that are applicable “in the context of 
environmental harm generally should apply to climate change 
as well.”181 
Second, the climate policies of the Trump administration 
conflict with principles of international law on climate change.  
Under the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities (“CBDRRC”), which 
refers specifically to how responsibilities are allocated among 
countries,182 responsibility for current and historical emissions 
are of special importance.183  The data is clear: the United States 
is the world leader in cumulative GHG global emissions, having 
contributed approximately 30% of historical GHG emissions.184  
This principle still binds the United States, since it remains a 
party to the UNFCCC.185  Likewise, the principle of intra-and-
inter-generational equity, as defined in the first part of Article 
3(1) of the UNFCCC,186 is applicable.  It determines rights and 
obligations regarding the use and enjoyment of natural and 
cultural resources inherited by the present generation and 
states that they are to be “passed on to future generations in no 
worse condition than received.”187  The legal force of this 
 
180. Id. at 219. 
181. Id. at 220. 
182. See UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 3(1), at 9. (“The Parties should 
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”). 
183. The principle itself is disputed because different countries may reach 
different conclusions regarding the optimal level of emission reduction.  See, 
e.g., Esty & Moffa, supra note 1, at 778–79. 
184. DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT: ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE 
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING 156 (2002) (illustrating that 
the dataset encompasses the years between 1800 to 2002). 
185. Confirming that the United States remains a party to the UNFCCC 
treaty: https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties-
convention-and-observer-states. 
186. See UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 3(1), at 9 (“The Parties should 
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”). 
187. Catherine Redgwell, Principles and Emerging Norms in 
International Law: Intra-and-Inter-Generational Equity, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 188 (Cinnamon P. 
Carlarne et al. eds., 2016). 
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principle is disputed, but it should be considered among the 
factors that will inform policy decisions regarding climate 
change in the future.188  None of these principles and 
agreements, however, are a priority in the Trump 
administration’s domestic and international agendas. 
A similar rationale applies to the precautionary principle.  
According to its formulation under Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC, 
parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, 
prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change and to 
mitigate its adverse effects, and a lack of scientific certainty 
should not be used to postpone measures where threats of 
serious or irreversible damage exist.189  Considering the 
damages of climate change and the fact that, as noted above, the 
United States remains a party to the UNFCCC, the country 
should reduce GHG emissions, the impacts of which are 
notoriously difficult to reverse.  For some scholars, precaution is 
not a binary approach, but instead a spectrum.190  Nonetheless, 
an argument could be made that the precautionary principle 
would at least oblige the United States to meet its NDC’s under 
the Paris Agreement.  Further, conscientious accord with the 
precautionary principle would also largely lead to limited use of 
old technologies, such as fossil fuels,191 but the Trump 
administration has not hesitated to support expansion of their 
use while in power. 
The United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement 
violates general principles of international law that require 
member states “to contribute to the conservation, protection, 
and restoration of the integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem” 
through good-faith cooperation; and these principles were 
recently highlighted in a UN Report.192  These obligations are 
perfected through the principle of non-regression, which 
disallows backtracking on environmental protections while 
advancing, under the principle of progression, increased 
 
188. See id. at 195–96. 
189. UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 3(3), at 9. 
190. Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution and Climate Change, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 169 (Cinnamon P. 
Carlarne et al. eds., 2016). 
191. See id. at 170. 
192. U.N. Secretary-General, Gaps in International Environmental Law 
and Environment-Related Instruments: Towards a Global Pact for the 
Environment, ¶¶ 16–17, U.N. DOC. A/73/419 (Nov. 30, 2018). 
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protection in such matters.193  Hence, the Trump 
administration’s decision to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement, as well as to continue supporting fossil fuels, is not 
in accord with the principle of non-regression, at the very least. 
Having established that the Trump administration’s actions 
are clearly in conflict with international human rights and with 
multiple international, environmental, and climate law 
principles, this Section moves next to the challenges involved in 
international liability for climate harms.  A technical note is 
required at this point: state liability differs from state 
responsibility insofar as state liability encompasses situations in 
which no illegal or unlawful conduct has occurred, despite any 
harm triggered by the conduct.194  The ILC adopted the Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for International 
Wrongful Acts, which addresses the consequences of states’ 
internationally wrongful activities,195 but there has been no 
consensus to push toward a formalized convention (or treaty), 
and no further action has been pursued.196  Article 1 states that 
any internationally wrongful act by a state, whether a lapse of 
international obligation or a serious breach of a mandatory norm 
of international law, can trigger international consequences for 
that state.197 
Currently, state responsibility for harm to the international 
environment is based upon the primary rule of the Trail Smelter 
arbitration.198  Under this decision: 
 
193. Id. at ¶ 22. 
194. Mark A. Drumbl, Trail Smelter and the International Law 
Commission’s Work on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
and State Liability, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS 
FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 87 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. 
Miller ed., 2006). 
195. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n on Its Fifty-
Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Draft 
Articles]. 
196. Drumbl, supra note 194, at 87. 
197. Draft Articles, supra note 195, at 32.  The latter addresses 
reparations of the damages and requires causation between the conduct or 
omission of the State and such harm.  After the ILC adopted such draft articles, 
some commentators prefer referring to them merely as “Articles.” 
198. The Trail Smelter Arbitration (1941) involved a Canadian smelter 
that produced fumes that caused damages in Washington State.  The tribunal 
ruled that the activity of the smelter needed to be reduced and regulated in 
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No State has the right to use or permit the use of 
its territory in such a manner as to cause injury 
by fumes in or to the territory of another or the 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of 
serious consequence and the injury is established 
by clear and convincing evidence.199 
 
Accordingly, countries are obligated to refrain from causing 
transboundary harm.200  This prohibition, as well as the duty to 
compensate (the “polluter pays” principle),201 means that state 
responsibility is a double-edged sword, and the international 
regime both assumes harm will occur and encourages prevention 
of that harm.202 
In this legal regime, the primary rule of the Trail Smelter 
arbitration case remains pertinent for cases of environmental 
harm, which includes those arising out of climate change.  For 
instance, it has been contended that the United States’ failure 
to take meaningful efforts to reduce carbon emissions under the 
Bush and Trump administrations appear to collide with the 
main rule established in Trail Smelter.203  It is noteworthy that 
the preamble of the UNFCCC204 clearly refers to the principles 
 
accordance with the regime determined in the award. See U.N., Reports of 
International Arbitration Awards by the United Nations: Trail Smelter Case 
1905, 1965 (United States v. Canada, 1941) (2006), 
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf [hereinafter Trial Smelter 
Arbitration]. 
199. Id. 
200. Id.  In addition to the duty to prevent transboundary harm, Trail 
Smelter determined that, under the “polluter pays” principle, the polluting 
state must compensate for the transboundary harm it caused.  Rebecca M. 
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller, Transboundary Harm in International Law, in 
TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL 
SMELTER ARBITRATION 3 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006). 
201. Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 198; Bratspies & Miller, supra 
note 200, at 3–4 (emphasizing the modern declaration of state responsibility 
for transboundary harm, while criticizing the narrowness of the decision, 
because the defendant was held liable only if the resulting harm was “of serious 
economic consequence . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
202. Bratspies & Miller, supra note 200, at 9. 
203. Dan Farber, International Liability for Harm: Epidemics and 
Pollution, LEGALPLANET (May 12, 2020), https://legal-
planet.org/2020/05/12/international-liability-for-harm-epidemics-and-
pollution/ (referring to liability). 
204. UNFCCC, supra note 19, at Preamble (“States have, in accordance 
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of the Trail Smelter arbitration in the context of climate 
change.205  Nonetheless, causation is a major obstacle to the 
establishment of such international responsibility.206  To the 
extent that the Trail Smelter decision was between two friendly 
states, it may be of limited practical relevance for transboundary 
pollution problems with multiple tortfeasors, as dispute 
settlement in international law remains largely consensual and 
apportion of responsibility is very complex in practice.207 
Importantly, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 
Rio Declaration also obligate countries to avoid causing 
transboundary harm, although this obligation is not absolute.208  
The larger ripples of the Trail Smelter arbitration are evident in 
wide-ranging requirements that countries undertake due 
diligence209 and, most importantly, in the adoption of the 
obligation into customary international law.210  However, 
countries have defined this obligation differently.  In the United 
States, for instance, if the EPA “has reason to believe that any 
 
with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, 
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.”). 
205. Russell A. Miller, Surprising Parallels Between Trail Smelter and the 
Global Climate Change Regime, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 167 (Rebecca M. 
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006). 
206. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, International Responsibility and Liability, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Daniel 
Bodansky et al. eds., 2012). 
207. Phoebe Okowa, The Legacy of Trail Smelter in the Field of 
Transboundary Air Pollution, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 195, 202 (Rebecca M. 
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006). 
208. See U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, principle 22 (June 1972); U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), principle 2 (Aug. 12, 
1992). 
209. Jesse L. Reynolds, International Law, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND 
THE LAW: REGULATION AND LIABILITY FOR SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT AND 
CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL 57, 116 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 
2018). 
210. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8). 
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air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or 
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated 
to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country,” the 
agency must act.211 
Despite these mandated requirements for agencies toward 
action, Part II clearly showed the oppositional activities 
undertaken by the Trump administration.  This conflict has 
persisted despite unequivocal scientific evidence that “[i]t would 
be worth freeing ourselves from fossil fuels even if global 
warming didn’t exist,” simply based on the co-benefits of clean 
air for public health and the environment.212  After all, coal is 
the single largest contributor of carbon dioxide, is responsible for 
more than one-third of global emissions, and is a major factor 
that adversely affects public health and biodiversity.213  The 
same study contends that those local co-benefits are not 
particularly sensitive to different discount rates, which favors 
the immediate adoption of policies phasing out coal.214 
In addition, this Part has illustrated how the United States’ 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is likely to negatively 
impact the goals of the treaty.  Current projections estimate that 
the United States may now be able to meet its NDCs for 2020,215 
which became possible mainly due to the suspension of travels 
caused by the pandemic.216  Before the crisis, the UN listed the 
country as requiring additional action to meet its NDCs.217  
Currently, the renowned Climate Tracker Action rates United 
States’ climate policies as “critically insufficient” (the worst 
 
211. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a). 
212. David Roberts, Air Pollution Is Much Worse than We Thought, VOX 
(Aug. 12, 2020, 10:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2020/8/12/21361498/climate-change-air-pollution-us-india-
china-deaths (noting that, in a recent hearing of the House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, Drew Shindell discussed the scientific evidence that air 
pollution leads to 250,000 deaths per year in the U.S. alone). 
213. Sebastian Rauner et al., Coal-Exit Health and Environmental 
Damage Reductions Outweigh Economic Impacts, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 
308, 308−09 (2020). 
214. See id. at 311−12. 
215. Country Summary: United States, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER (July 
30, 2020), https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa/ [hereinafter CAT]. 
216. Id. 
217. Emissions Gap Report 2019, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME (Nov. 2019), 
https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2019 
(showing that the United States was the leader in carbon dioxide emissions per 
capita in 2018). 
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performance possible under their scale),218 and the withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement was a determinative factor. 
In light of all the arguments addressed in this Section, state 
liability for international harms caused by climate change is 
rare, as causation and apportion are major hurdles to 
enforcement.  That said, caution is highly recommended.  
President Trump’s choice to withdraw from the Paris Agreement 
mirrors in the international sphere his domestic policy of 
supporting fossil fuels.  These policies are consistently 
denigrating both the United States’ international reputation 
and undermining its leadership, while increasing GHG 
emissions and global pollution.  These consequences negatively 
impact the environment and public health of both the United 
States as well as the global community, further aggravating the 
adverse impact of the pandemic. 
IV. THE UNITED STATES CLIMATE POLICIES AND INEQUALITY IN 
THE POST-PANDEMIC WORLD 
This Part illustrates how the United States’ climate policies 
are likely to aggravate both domestic and global inequalities in 
the aftermath of the pandemic.219  It focuses on the 
disproportionate impact of climate change on minorities in the 
United States and in the developing world, examines 
similarities shared by these inequalities, and investigates how 
those who are bearing the major consequences of COVID-19 
have already begun to face the adverse impacts of climate 
change.  It also addresses the need for regulatory action based 
on prioritarianism and social resilience on the domestic front.  In 
 
218. See CAT, supra note 215. 
219. Despite focusing on inequalities, this Part does not frame the issue 
in terms of climate justice; the vast recent literature which targets historical 
emissions and the related, need to share the burden.  These issues are 
addressed from an international law perspective in Part III, Section B.  For 
specific references on climate change, see, among others: Lukas H. Meyer & 
Dominic Roser, Climate Justice and Historical Emissions, 13 CRITICAL REV. 
INT. SOC. & POL. PHIL., 229 (2010); Simon Caney, Two Kinds of Climate Justice: 
Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens, 22 J. POL. PHIL. 125 (2014); Paul 
Almeida, Climate Justice and Sustained Transnational Mobilization, 16 
GLOBALIZATIONS 973 (2019).  This Article does recommend caution in applying 
morality-based arguments to the behavior of states, as climate change is a 
problem due to its harms to people, not to countries.  ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID 
WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 6 (2010). 
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the international sphere, cooperation among countries remains 
a requirement for effective international policies on climate 
change and response to the pandemic. 
Climate change was interfering with economies around the 
world long before the pandemic.  The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change estimates with high confidence that extreme 
events may be more devastating economically than the impact 
of climate change overall.220  As the world becomes warmer, 
rising global sea levels and forced migration due to 
desertification will intensify competition for energy resources 
and land.221  The situation is even more dire in developing 
countries, as economic resources are scarce and adaptation 
measures are less frequent.  In a circular logic, these countries 
also suffer more from harm related to climate change than those 
in the developed world.222  Developed countries not only have 
more resources but are also located primarily in the Northern 
Hemisphere where temperatures are likely to be more 
temperate than those in the Southern Hemisphere.223 
Climate change has a disproportionate impact in developing 
nations because they have fewer resources to a changing 
world.224  As such, they are more vulnerable to increased 
temperatures and any related consequences that might 
negatively affect health, cause illness, incapacitate, or even kill 
people.225  This vulnerability decreases productivity and 
devastates both family unity and related social networks.226  As 
the increase in GHGs is among one of the leading causes of 
climate change, ineffective climate policies (including a less 
resolute Paris Agreement) increases the likelihood of excessive 
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221. For a legal discussion about the causes of climate change, see CHRIS 
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222. POSNER & SYKES, supra note 8, at 232. 
223. See id.; see also Kolstad, supra note 9, at 213 (finding, with high 
confidence, that the impact of climate change varies in accordance with the 
geographical location and level of development, among other factors). 
224. Kolstad, supra note 9, at 213. 
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Warming of 1.5°C, 10−12 (Oct. 2018), 
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infectious vector-borne diseases, and other public health costs). 
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rain, snow, tornadoes, flooding, droughts, tsunamis, famines, 
and other natural disasters.227  The UN Security Council 
recently recognized climate change as a “threat multiplier,” as 
climate-related risks and conflicts are already a reality for 
millions of people around the globe, threatening peace and 
security.228  Hence, the likelihood that international conflicts 
will arise out of changes related to climate is also significantly 
increased.  Considering the gap between developed and 
developing countries, and the urgent need for action on climate 
matters, the UN enacted the Sustainable Development Goals as 
part of its 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  These 
goals are meant to serve as an urgent call to action to citizens 
across the globe.229 
Although all member states adopted the agenda in 2015 and 
are consequently expected to uphold the Sustainable 
Development Goals, the Unites States’ withdrawal from both the 
WHO and Paris Agreement conflicts with those stated goals.  It 
is noteworthy that the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable 
Development Goals are the UN’s roadmaps toward fostering 
recovery in the aftermath of the pandemic.230  The adverse 
impacts of climate change will be magnified at that time as the 
pandemic will deepen systemic socio-economic vulnerabilities, 
increase income and wealth gaps, overburden (or decimate) 
healthcare systems in less-developed countries, and generally 
contribute to the spread of emerging zoonotic diseases.231 
Widening this gap between developed and developing 
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Environmental Gains from the Coronavirus Pandemic, PLOS ONE 1, 8–9 (July 
9, 2020). 
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countries is the fact that the developed world is responsible for 
significantly more pollution.  A recent review of the literature 
highlights that the world’s top 10% of income earners are 
responsible for a range of 25%–43% of environmental impact, 
while the world’s bottom 10% of earners exert only 3–5% of 
impact.232  Based on such numbers, the study argues that 
environmental impact is, to a large extent, caused and driven by 
the world’s richest citizens, with affluent households worldwide 
being by far the strongest determinant and accelerator of 
increased environmental and social impacts.233 
This is even more disturbing if considered in light of the fact 
that certain segments of the population will feel the effects of 
climate change and extreme weather much more dramatically 
than others.  The regressive nature of carbon-pricing means that 
consumers bear the costs and those with lower socioeconomic 
standing, who spend a greater percentage of their income on 
non-discretionary goods and services, will suffer more.234  If it is 
true that climate change does not impact people in isolation, it 
certainly affects the less well-off disproportionally and in a 
vicious cycle.235  Minorities will be critically affected, as will 
those living in disadvantaged socioeconomic areas.236  Native 
and indigenous peoples whose lifestyles depend upon nature will 
also experience heightened difficulties.237  Therefore, the 
reduction of GHG emissions and effective climate change 
policies are justified on a distributional basis under 
prioritarianism, namely, the understanding that regulations 
should maximize the wellbeing of all, with priority given to those 
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who are worst off.238 
Prioritarianism can be more effectively achieved if 
implemented at the highest sphere of governance.  Here, the 
pandemic may provide a helpful analogy for the need for action 
at the highest levels (both national and global): implementation 
of a myriad of local policies is costly, complicated, and ultimately 
inefficient, as they are limited to their geographical location.239  
Subnational units are not well suited for regulatory action on 
national conduct leading to global externalities.240  Further, 
subnational entities must consider that carbon-intensive 
industry, if banned from their region, would simply transfer to 
less stringent jurisdictions nearby—so-called “leakage.”241  Such 
regulatory efforts may lead to even greater harm,242 such as the 
hardships that would occur if these jurisdictions were left, due 
to loss of industry, with less-developed safety nets for their 
population. 
In such a context, the lack of federal climate policies in the 
United States is negatively affecting the rights of minorities, 
which is especially concerning now, as the nation is assessing its 
inherent inequality.  It is telling that, under the Trump 
administration’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, fossil fuel 
interests had faster access to stimulus money than many local 
governments did.243  The pandemic illustrates the extraordinary 
damage caused in the absence of an effective national 
government.  For instance, the delayed federal action forced 
states to compete for ventilators and personal protective 
equipment, which led to a significant waste of precious time and 
resources; meanwhile, the President golfed as the pandemic 
worsened.244  In the global context, it is clear that the “Trump 
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administration’s chaotic management has left an indelible 
impression around the world of a country incapable of handling 
its own crises, let alone anybody else’s.”245  In the domestic 
sphere, the Trump administration’s response to the pandemic 
(with its decentralization to state and local governments) has 
been considered “[s]tructured to [f]ail.”246 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, hospital admissions during the first half of 2020 
were, on average, 5.5 times higher for American Indians, 4.4 
times higher for Black people, and 4 times higher for Latinos 
than they were for white Americans.247  Telemedicine itself 
exacerbates exclusions, as it assumes access to a computer and 
internet, a basic command of medical literacy, and minimum 
fluency in the English language.  Furthermore, various social 
determinants of health are plagued by inequity in the United 
States, including housing availability, access and utilization of 
healthcare, income, levels of education and exposure to disease 
due to work function, level of discrimination, and reliance on 
public transportation; each of these has been a factor in the 
disproportional impact of COVID-19 in the United States.248  
Importantly, traditional environmental justice litigation is 
unlikely to change this scenario.  In fact, though the literature 
states that human rights law may offer an avenue for redress, 
claims addressing the disparate impact of policies on minorities 
in the United States have not succeeded due to the requirement 
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of intent from regulators.249 
Therefore, environmental and international human rights 
actions are, perhaps more than ever,250 paramount to securing a 
“fair chance in the race of life” with the path for social resilience 
being a requirement to guide regulatory action in the country.251  
In the aftermath of the pandemic, all levels of regulators will 
have an unprecedented opportunity to reach out, support 
inclusiveness, and implement social resilience actions, including 
the creation of jobs and work training, effective distribution of 
medication, and investments in family care.  Research 
demonstrates that Black, Latino, and Indigenous communities 
living in the United States have been disproportionately affected 
by the pandemic, and that those who live in high environmental 
risk areas are facing more severe impacts.252  The findings 
conclude that the same communities “that have borne the brunt 
of the impact of COVID-19 this year have borne the brunt of the 
impact of air, water, toxic, and hazardous waste pollution for 
decades prior.”253 
Similar results are expected to occur on the global level, 
despite data on ethnicity still being a challenge.254  Economic 
inequality, overcrowded housing, environmental risks, limited 
availability of healthcare, and bias in access and use of care are 
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significant factors in explaining the disproportionate global 
impact on minorities.  Moreover, racial and ethnic minorities are 
found in higher numbers in some jobs that carry an increased 
risk, such as the “transport, health, and cleaning sectors.”255  
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle 
Bachelet, remarked that the pandemic exposes “inequalities 
that have too long been ignored,” despite being obvious.256  The 
deepening of such vulnerabilities is a concern of the World 
Health Organization and of other international actors who have 
accordingly created a system to ensure access to any future 
vaccines: COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (“COVAX”).257  
However, the question of who will have access to the vaccine still 
lingers despite the obvious injustice of a potential situation in 
which health care workers in developing nations do not get 
access to the vaccine while low-risk people in the developed 
world do.258 
In such a context, the need for international cooperation on 
climate and health matters has increased.  As UN Secretary-
General António Guterres remarked, the scale of the crisis 
requires countries to demonstrate solidarity to the most 
vulnerable communities and nations.259  The United States’ 
leadership, however, has been deaf to such pledges, and 
consequently, has been further diminished by the pandemic. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article analyzes the current challenges that climate 
change policies face, focusing on the linkages between the 
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climate change policies of the Trump administration and the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and on the effects of those linkages both in 
the United States and globally.  In particular, this Article 
addresses the Trump administration’s attacks on climate 
science and its deregulatory climate agenda as well as the 
United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement.  In 
addition, it discusses principles of international law and the 
challenges related to state liability for environmental harms in 
the context of the COVID-19 crisis.  This Article also assesses 
how the United States’ climate policies are likely to aggravate 
inequalities domestically as well as globally in the aftermath of 
the pandemic. 
Part II focuses on the domestic sphere, analyzing the 
climate deregulation measures that will likely have an adverse 
impact on the COVID-19 crisis.  In addition to discussing attacks 
on climate science by the Trump administration, Part II 
examines the following proposed deregulatory policies: (i) the 
direction given to agencies to neglect GHG emissions and the 
related grant of a license that authorizes construction of 
pipelines as well as undue delay of regulation issuance, (ii) the 
repeal of the Clean Air Act, (iii) the repeal of the Clean Power 
Plan and related threats to air quality, (iv) the flexibilization of 
the National Environmental Policy Act, (v) the rollback of 
regulations promoting fuel efficiency, and (vi) the flexibilization 
of regulatory standards and overall enforcement during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
Part II finds that such major deregulatory climate policies 
proposed by the Trump administration on climate matters 
reiteratively use flawed scientific evidence and temper with cost-
benefit analysis.  Hence, these deregulatory climate measures 
disregard the best available science, including the social cost of 
carbon, despite the administration being required to consider 
both.  To put these deregulatory measures in perspective: the 
total effect of all the rollbacks pursued by the Trump 
administration may well surpass the number of deaths caused 
by the COVID-19 virus.  Therefore, such climate policies do not 
maximize wellbeing.  Further, they will have a devastating 
economic impact due to the disregard of valid cost considerations 
related to the preservation of health and life, to the 
environment, and to the climate as a whole. 
Part III analyzes a major deregulatory action that will 
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negatively impact the pandemic: the withdrawal of the United 
States from the Paris Agreement.  It concludes that the United 
States’ reputation and leadership have been jeopardized by the 
climate policies of the Trump administration.  These policies, 
while assuming free riding, are actually increasing emissions 
domestically and beyond.  This is against the maximization of 
overall wellbeing in the United States as well as globally 
because, in economics, improving environmental quality is often 
connected to increasing marginal costs, which in practice means 
that the first steps are also the most cost-effective.  It is 
noteworthy that law and economic theorists have contended that 
increased environmental performance (favored by stronger 
environmental regulations) leads to increased competitiveness 
among nations and industries—the Porter hypothesis.  
Therefore, the more a country considers the protection of health 
and the environment, the more wellbeing maximization occurs.  
This, however, is not the case in the United States, as the 
climate change policies of the Trump administration are stirred 
in the opposite direction. 
Part III also examines principles of international law and 
the challenges related to state liability for environmental harms 
in the context of the COVID-19 crisis.  It finds that the United 
States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement violates general 
principles of international law, including the principle of non-
regression, which disallows backtracking on environmental 
protections.  As for climate liability, Part III finds that the 
primary rule of the Trail Smelter arbitration case remains 
pertinent.  Nonetheless, state liability for international harms 
caused by climate change is rare, as causation and apportion are 
major hurdles to enforcement.  That said, caution is highly 
recommended.  President Trump’s choice to withdraw from the 
Paris Agreement mirrors in the international sphere his 
domestic policy of supporting fossil fuels.  These policies are 
consistently denigrating the United States’ international 
reputation and undermining its leadership while increasing 
GHG emissions and global pollution.  These consequences 
negatively impact the environment and public health of both the 
United States and the global community, aggravating the 
adverse impact of the pandemic.  Accordingly, the consequences 
could not be more severe. 
In such a context, Part IV discusses how the United States’ 
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climate policies are likely to aggravate inequalities, both 
domestic and global, in the aftermath of the pandemic.  It 
examines how these inequalities are similar and highlighted 
that those who are bearing the major consequences of COVID-
19 have already been facing the adverse impacts of climate 
change.  It found that regulatory action should be based on 
prioritarianism and social resilience on the domestic front.  In 
the international sphere, cooperation among countries remains 
a requirement for effective international policies on climate 
change and response to the pandemic.  As the UN Secretary-
General has recently remarked: 
 
The recovery from the COVID-19 crisis must lead 
to a different economy.  Everything we do during 
and after this crisis must be with a strong focus 
on building more equal, inclusive and sustainable 
economies and societies that are more resilient in 
the face of pandemics, climate change and the 
many other global challenges we face.260 
 
In light of all the arguments considered above, this Article 
concludes that President Trump’s climate policies are not 
maximizing the wellbeing of the U.S. population and have 
exacerbated the impact of the pandemic domestically as well as 
globally.  Accordingly, the United States needs an approach to 
climate change policies that is coherent on both the national and 
global stages.  Ultimately, these policies need to reconcile the 
maximization of wellbeing and equity, leading to a paradigmatic 
change: instead of the poisoning of the commons, the country will 
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APPENDIX: FIGURES 
FIGURE 1: TABLE CONCERNING THE CARBON DIOXIDE PRODUCED 
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261. Figure 1 was built by the author according to information available
at: Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced When 
Different Fuels Are Burned?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=73&t=11 (last reviewed Mar. 6, 
2021). 
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FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF COVID-19 HOSPITALIZATION RATE IN 





262. Figure 2 is based on the CDC and state data compiled by Larsen et 
al., supra note 247 (noting that the CDC does not report COVID death rates 
for American Indians/Alaska Natives independently, state data suggests they 
are considerably higher than the country’s average, particularly in the 
Southwest). 
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